Within four years of its foundation the United Nations adopted a ringi Declaration of Human Rights that is considered a cornerstone of intern and governance. It took the UN General Assembly over forty more a Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Et and Linguistic Minorities.1 Whereas the Universal Declaration of H monitored and enforced by an important specialised agency very much limelight, the Declaration on Minorities lingers in relative obscurity.
As it is generally acknowledged that minorities are present amon members of the United Nations, the Declaration's dismal receptio puzzling. In this article I suggest that the reasons customarily invo neglect of the issue of minority rights, valid though these reasons identify the historical logic of minority rights. My argument is th define as minority rights have developed primarily as an indemn defeated parties; as such, minority rights and their historical prece considered inadequate by the vanquished and offensive by the victors. A and begrudged calculus of compensation, minority rights have be compete in terms of legitimacy with either an increasingly robust in human rights regime or with the right of national self-determination. 2 This argument, which may be loosely described as 'realist', differs from be equally loosely described as the 'liberal internationalist' position th most studies of minority issues. C. A. Macartney's classic work that st model of scholarship more than seventy years after its publication, seventeenth century origins of international minority protection in term of absolute state sovereignty and the assumption of the 'existence of a hi Other authors, concerned with more recent history, wring their hands at t incompatibility between national states and national minorities.4 The explanation of bilateral or multilateral provisions for minority protection draw on considerations of raison d'etat or competitive and punitive re states. A characteristic recent statement of this liberal internationalist po minority protection provisions as part of a grand Westphalian bargain th 350 years, according to which 'states are recognized as independent e power over their people to the extent that they do not violate cert minorities. If norms are violated, the international community has the co to intervene.' The purpose of this bargain is (paradoxically?) to decrease in and increase international stability. '5 In this article I propose to look, briefly, at the most frequent 
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Why are minority rights neglected?
The first explanation one hears about the fragile status of minority rights in the international sphere is that there is no internationally accepted definition of a minority. Indeed, the term 'minority' in the sense that concerns us here is a relative neologism. The term does not appear in international legal documents before the so-called 'Minorities Treaties' that accompany the post-World War I Peace Settlement although the notion of 'minorities' as applied to this problem was in general or colloquial use earlier.6 Note that the 'Minorities Treaties' mention only 'racial, linguistic or religious minorities', coyly avoiding the category of 'national minorities'. Moreover, since the formal introduction of the term, the customary locution has been 'individuals belonging to . . .' or individuals 'who differ from . . .', thus circumventing direct reference to the collective designation, 'minorities'.7 Nevertheless, if we are lacking an accepted definition of the term it is not for want of trying. The United Nations, through its Sub-Committee on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, has undertaken on several occasions to define a 'minority' in a satisfactory international legal sense. The most thorough such effort has given rise to the Capotorti Report, now almost three decades old.8 The report has received both praise and criticism but, ultimately, has not led to an accepted definition.
Although there is no common definition of a 'minority' one may legitimately doubt that the problem is a lexical one. Several state respondents to Capotorti's enquiry did, in fact, object 'minority.'10 Regardless of the credibility of some of those objecting Romania, for example -one may suggest that the second reason for a robust minority rights regime is a distaste for the term itself. 'If we av more common expression [national minorities] it is because the status of can never be fully equal to that of the majority', explained the Yug objection merely confirms the urgency of strengthening whatever minority rights regime exist today. Precisely because minority is ta inequality and inferiority, not merely numerical but substantial inferior of minority protection are in order. The objection does, however, reluctance of both states and those communities best described as minor this particular designation. As I propose to argue in this article, rejection is inscribed within a historical logic that is constitutive of the ver minority.
A third reason invoked for international resistance to minority rights protection is the, allegedly, sorry record of the League of Nations during the interwar period.12
The League did indeed inaugurate the first formally institutionalised minority rights regime. It can be plausibly argued, however, that its failure in this area was due to its selective and partial protection of minorities rather than to the principle of minority rights itself. In other words, the League of Nations failed because it offered too little rather than too much minority protection. It is telling that in the post-Cold War period there has been a renewal of interest in the mechanisms of minority protection that the League put into place.13
The interwar experience, with its tragic denouement, led statesmen also to conclude that a strong rights regime founded upon and even limited to individual human rights was an adequate safeguard for minorities as well.14 This constituted a fourth reason for dismissing the need for minority rights protection. Human rights, it was maintained in 1945 and for decades thereafter, encompassed minority rights. In other words, the rights of individuals covered the rights of individuals belonging to minorities. It is difficult to imagine that this thesis was genuinely believed by all the 10 Romania commented that 'The term "minority" -a category too broad and indeterminate -is no longer used to describe differences of race, sex, religion or nationality among citizens ... In the past, the term "minority" in general and the term "national minority" in particular were debased and became almost synonymous with the various forms of inequality between the "majority" and the "minority".' Capotorti, Study on the Rights of Persons, p. 14 'The term "minority protection" has today [1950] been absorbed by the universal principle of the rights of man. Thus the motivations behind it have changed: it is now humanitarian instead of political, universal instead of particular; but its goals and its scope are still not clear. Despite the changes, the raw material of the problem is the same. The United Nations, possessed of its new international concept of human rights has thus unloaded onto its minorities organ a vague and general concept, with both old and new aspects, and the three years of effort of that organ to crystallise it have, consequently, been marked by confusion and hesitancy. It is as if one had picked up the piece of a broken vase, but had found the room decorations changed, and couldn't decide if the vase still went well in the room, and moreover couldn't find all the pieces. So the vase lies unrepaired, still on its old religio. The terms of the Peace of Augsburg authorised suzerains of the numerous imperial estates or statelets to determine (through the so-called ius reformandi)
whether the inhabitants of their domain were to be Catholic or Lutheran. There were certain allowances and exceptions: religious dissidents could emigrate freely during a stipulated period; ecclesiastical principalities were to remain Catholic which meant that a prince-bishop who converted to Lutheranism had to relinquish his lordship.23 Barring such specific reservations, the rights of rulers over their subjects were not constrained by the requirement that they respect the faith of a religious minority among their subjects.
The treaties signed in Westphalia follow what was to become a ritualised succession of provisions -invocation, peace clauses, amnesty, guarantees, territorial arrangements.24 All in all, however, these treaties resemble an array of notarised documents concluded by landowners disposing of their estates or by businessmen making a property deal. Of course, some provisions are of more obvious historical significance; such might be the recognition of the independence of the United Provinces of the Netherlands in a separate treaty with Spain.25 However, most stipulations of the treaties may be described as of a 'house-keeping ' variety inasmuch as they provide in minute detail for the disposal of land and chattel. The property affairs of the Landgravine of Hesse alone, for instance, occupy half a dozen articles in the Treaty of Munster.26
Next to such clauses one finds passages that explicitly connect cession of territory with restrictions expressed in terms of religious minority concerns. warning against extension of the terms of the Edict of Nantes (15 instituted limited toleration of Protestants in France and that authorised them to set up places of worship in some designated localities. If this is so, one must conclude that the treaty provision is, somewhat perversely, not about extending minority rights but about limiting them. Whatever the case, the thrust of the provision is clear: although the emperor is ceding territory, he is not ceding it unconditionally; and although France is acquiring territory, it is acknowledging the residual interest of the emperor in his former lands.
The Thirty Years War strengthened France and Sweden and weakened the Empire. However, inasmuch as the Peace of Westphalia reflected a military standstill brought on by exhaustion, it avoided explicit overall attribution of victor or vanquished status. The underlying principle behind the Westphalian treaties was a return to a territorial and religious status quo. It was not entirely a status quo ante bellum but, for some purposes, it was a status quo ante set, after long disputes that prolonged the hostilities, at a time point chosen in the course of the War. This was made explicit in the Treaty of Osnabruck's general principle that members of the minority confession should be 'patiently suffered and tolerated'. It even specified that these minority subjects should not be excluded from guilds, hospitals or alms-houses, nor should they be made to pay more for burial than the majority subjects.27
The meticulously enumerated terms of the peace provisions meant that the belligerent parties had to restitute some lands, towns, fortresses and other property to their previous owners even as they had their titles confirmed to other acquisitions.
Whatever the new status of the territory, it also meant that pre-existing religious configurations were to be respected. Thus, we read in the Treaty of Munster:
That it shall not for the future, or at present, prove to the damage and prejudice of any Town, that has been taken and kept by the one or other Party; but that all and every one of them, with their Citizens and Inhabitants, shall enjoy as well the general Benefit of the Amnesty, as the rest of this Pacification. And for the Remainder of their Rights and Privileges, Ecclesiastical and Secular, which they enjoy'd before these Troubles, they shall be maintain'd therein; save, nevertheless the Rights of Sovereignty, and what depends thereon, for the Lords to whom they belong (Article CXVII).
With respect to the newly-created Electorate of the Palatinate conceded by the emperor, we read:
That those of the Confession of Augsburg, and particularly the inhabitants of Oppenheim, shall be put in possession again of their Churches, and Ecclesiastical Estates, as they were in the year 1624, as also that all others of the said Confession of Augsburg, who shall demand it, shall have the free Exercise of their Religion, as well in publick Churches at the appointed Hours, as in private in their own Houses, or in others chosen for this purpose by their Ministers, or by those of their neighbours, preaching the Word of God (Article XXVIII).
Here, the Catholic emperor is enjoining another Catholic sovereign to respect Protestant minority rights. This can be understood in the context of an overall religious aggiornamento that puts Catholicism and Protestantism, now in its two variants of Lutheranism and Calvinism, on a more or less equal footing. From the point of view of our concern, however, it is another indication of the use of what we would now call religious minority rights to temper territorial losses and rein in territorial gains.
We may take a final confirmation of our argument from provisions concerning Bohemia, the province where the Thirty Years War began and where the Emperor emerged as victor after having vanquished the Bohemian Protestant Estates. Here it was the turn of the Emperor to make concessions to his defeated opponents.
As for the rest, Law and Justice shall be administer'd in Bohemia, and in all the other Hereditary Provinces of the Emperor, without any respect; as to the Catholicks, so also to the Subjects, Creditors, Heirs, or private Persons, who shall be of the Confession of Augsburg, if they have any Pretensions, and enter or prosecute any Actions to obtain Justice (Article XLVI).
The Peace of Westphalia, a monumental multilateral gathering with no precedents and only few successors on this scale, established a paradigm for the insertion of religious minority clauses into international agreements. In future treaties, state parties would assert the right to claim an interest in the status of religious minorities in a co-signatory state. Such assertions would frequently imply a unilateral right of intervention on behalf of a religious minority.28 Future treaties granting territorial concessions often limited provisions concerning religious minorities to the area ceded, a feature deriving from the emergence of modern boundaries in the immediate aftermath of Westphalia.29 Generally speaking, these treaties enshrined a religious status quo ante that reduced the losses of those who were ceding territory and the gains of those who were acquiring it .
Within a few years, the Westphalian paradigm was reproduced in the Treaty of Oliva (1660) by which Sweden acquired Prussian Pomerania and Livonia.30 In this treaty, Poland stipulated that Livonian Catholics would continue to practice their faith while the clauses concerning Pomerania confirmed the freedom of religion that had existed previously in the ceded Baltic cities. With the Treaty of Nijmengen (1678) Louis XIV returned the city of Maastricht to the United Provinces of the Netherlands while obtaining that Catholicism should re-acquire the rights that it had enjoyed there under a convention of 1632 and that it had since lost. He insisted that a similar clause in the Treaty of Ryswick (1697) New France. In tacit acknowledgement of the depreciating implicat provisions, the treaty stipulated that these concessions would only be app as they were compatible with British law.32
The principle of requiring religious guarantees in return for ceding terr frequently applied after Westphalia that it is easy to lose sight of its hist The following extract from one of the documents adopted by the Congre in 1815 reminds us explicitly of its underlying justification. In cedin Duchy of Savoy to the Republic of Geneva, the King of Sardinia decl His Majesty, unable to consent to having part of his territory united with a st different religion is dominant, without obtaining for the inhabitants of the cou ceding the certitude that they will enjoy free exercise of their religion, that the continue to have the means necessary for the expenses of worship, and that th themselves enjoy the full rights of citizens (Article III).33
To assuage the monarch's apparent anguish at the loss of his subjects future fate under alien auspices, the clause enumerated extremely specifi regarding the protection of the Catholic faith in the area ceded. District as well as the number of Catholic priests, were to remain unchanged. schoolteachers were to be employed and there were to be no Protestan this area (with one exception). The proportion of Catholics in the mun and alternation between Protestant and Catholic mayors was guarante of future population changes. In short, though these areas had changed so the terms of the previous sovereignty persisted in the religious sphere. S however, by 1815 religious guarantees had spilled over into the civil arena. In this respect, the Congress of Vienna opened a new era in the pr minority rights.
The Vienna principle 'A World Restored' is how Henry Kissinger entitled his study of the Vienna.34 In fact, the statesmen gathered in Vienna were fully, if regretfully, aware of the significance of the changes produced by Revolution and the Napoleonic era. Instead of seeking to restore all forme in their previous borders, they restored some rulers, abolished som modified many borders. In the conceptual terms that interest us here firmed the principle of retaining the religious status quo of a ceded terri as we have seen in the case of the King of Sardinia and his losses to G was equally the case with respect to dispositions concerning the Netherlands, religious minority rights became much more explicit than they had been previously. The most fateful innovation at Vienna, however, and one that justifies speaking of a new era in the pre-history of minority rights, was the attempt to adumbrate what may be anachronistically referred to as national minority rights. Nationality was an unknown term at the outset of the French Revolution.35 When statesmen gathered in Vienna a quarter century later, the term itself had not yet acquired its later formal meaning but its relevance was widely acknowledged, not least among these statesmen themselves. They were aware that national sentiment had been both the mainspring and the undoing of the French Republic and of the Napoleonic empire and they therefore stepped carefully around this issue. Poland among Russia, Prussia and Austria between 1772 and 1795, ha Poland from the map. Described by Lord Acton as the crime that w Europe for a century, the partitions weighed on the minds of the assem and inspired solutions so incompatible with the interests of individual pa recently victorious and still allied powers almost came to blows.39 W (and France which was making a rapid comeback at Vienna thanks to the allies) took a posture in favour of the restoration of an independent the three partitioning powers (obviously) demurred.40 All the parti suspicion on Russian designs for Poland which proposed a Polish uncertain dimensions but certainly under Russian influence. 41 The Congress eventually came to a complex territorial compromise ove lands that involved the transfer to Russia of parts of Prussian Poland in attaching parts of Saxony to Prussia. Most significantly from our p however, the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna introduced a clause first time, extended protection to a national rather than a religious ground for this innovation was prepared by British Foreign Secretar who had expressed concern that anything less than integral restoration o state might create a 'hearth of troubles and insurrections'. Castlerea circulated a note arguing:
Experience has proved that it is not by counteracting all their habits and us that either the happiness of the Poles, or the peace of that important portion can be preserved. A fruitless attempt, too far persevered in by institutions for manners and sentiments, to make them forget their existence and even langua people, has been sufficiently tried and failed. It has only tended to excite a se discontent and self-degradation, and can never operate otherwise then as to commotion and to awaken them to a recollection of past misfortunes.
The undersigned . . . ardently desires that the illustrious monarchs, to whom of the Polish nation are confided, may be induced before they depart from Vi an engagement with each other, to treat as Poles, under whatever form of pol institutions they may think fit to govern them, the portions of the nation th placed under their respective sovereignties. The knowledge of such a determin tend to conciliate the general sentiment to their rule, and to do honour to the sovereigns in the eyes of their respective governments.42
This British proposition was ardently endorsed by France, the only othe had not profited from the partition of Poland. Sanctimoniously, and relish at the discomfort the prospect might cause to the partitioner Foreign Minister Talleyrand stated, 'the Poles will always form a f 39 Acton argued that [the partitions of Poland] 'awakened the theory of nationality in converting a dormant right into an aspiration and a sentiment into a political claim.' disappearance of the Polish state] 'there was 'a nation demanding to be united in a it were, wandering in search of a body in which to begin life over again; and, for the cry was heard that the arrangement of States was unjust -that their limits were unna a whole people was deprived of its right to constitute an independent community'. J Dahlberg-Acton, 'Nationality', Essays predicted that the day of their emancipation and reunification would come.43 In the end, however, Castlereagh's 'philanthropic counsels', as Metternich dubbed them, were accepted guardedly by the partitioning powers. This was the price that the partitioners had to pay to those who were not enjoying the spoils of Poland as well as to the despoiled Poles themselves. That the price was not excessive was confirmed by Metternich's astute if cynical remark that Russia, having satisfied its territorial ambitions, was content to offer the Poles 'some phantom of so-called nationality which would shut them up' [emphasis in original]. 44 The first article of the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna signed between Austria, France, Great Britain, Portugal, Prussia, Russia and Sweden on 9 June 1815 read:
The Poles, respectively subjects of Russia, Austria and Prussia, shall obtain a representation of their National Institutions regulated according to the mode of political existence that each of these Governments to which they belong will judge useful and appropriate to grant them.45 This provision was completed in bilateral treaties among the three partitioning powers that agreed upon:
measures most appropriate for consolidating the welfare of the Poles in the new relations in which they found themselves placed by the changes brought about by the fate of the Duchy of Warsaw [created under Napoleon -AL] and wishing, at the same time, to extend the effects of these benevolent dispositions to the provinces and districts which composed the former kingdom of Poland, by means of liberal arrangements, to the extent that circumstances have made this possible, and by the development of the most advantageous relations in the reciprocal commerce of the inhabitants (preamble).46
Specifically, this meant providing for the creation of a free trade and free navigation zone over former Polish territory. These provisions as well as those of the Final Act had no enforcement mechanisms.
At this point it bears notice that although identifying nationality in place of religion gave a radically different meaning to the understanding of who should constitute the subject of treaty protection, the logic of the process bore significant similarities to that of the past. In Vienna as in Westphalia and its successors, minority protection was extended to compensate a losing party and to limit a victor's enjoyment of his newly acquired possessions. In this case, however, the subjects of compensation were only notionally or indirectly rewarded. Caspar Bluntschli and Stanislao Pasquale Mancini had eliminated the connection between minority rights and nationality by replacing it with a new symbiosis of nationality and statehood.51 The national state not minority status was now the battle-cry of every nationality. As Acton put it, the 'greatest adversary of the rights of nationality is the modern theory of nationality'.52
The Eastern Question
Religious rights and nationality rights as the twin pillars of a minority rights system came together in a novel way in the course of the nineteenth century with respect to the changing status of Balkan Europe or what was to be known as the Eastern Question. Faced with the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the assertion of independence by Balkan peoples, the Great Powers reacted, almost instinctively, with the minority protection formulae that they had elaborated at Westphalia and Vienna. These halted neither the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire not the emergence of Balkan states. They did serve, however, to further discredit the notion of minority rights.
The establishment of an independent Greek state provided the first occasion for the Great Powers to enforce their composite conception of minority rights as involving both nationality and religion. In the London Protocol of 1830, Britain, France and Russia declared:
Les Plenipotentiares des trois Cours Alliees voulant en outre donner a la Grece une nouvelle preuve de la sollicitude bienveillante de leurs Souverains a son egard, et preserver ce pays des malheurs que la rivalite des cultes qui y sont professees pourrait y susciter, sont convenus que tous les sujets du nouvel Etat, quel que soit leur culte, devront etre admissibles a tous les emplois, fonctions et honneurs publics, et traites sur le pied d'une entiere egalite, sans egard a la difference de croyance dans leurs rapports religieux, civils ou politiques.53
This declaration is noteworthy in several respects. Like the previous minority rights clauses we have seen, it offers guarantees and concessions to a defeated party, in this case, the Ottoman Empire. Significantly, however, the defeated state is not a party to the agreement. Indeed, it is not a Christian state and it is not a member of the European state system. Moreover, although the subjects of the guarantees in the London Protocol are identified in religious terms, the guarantees all apply in the secular sphere. Certain clauses in earlier arrangements had b distinction between religious freedom and civil and political rights. H religion is clearly a stand-in for what was already being called 'nation The Greek case inaugurated a pattern that was to be respected thro nineteenth century and, arguably, one that would be applied after W well. In various treaties, the Great Powers continued to compensate defeat usually the Sublime Porte, by imposing national minority guarantees religious guarantees and limited to detached areas or to newly auton independent former Ottoman provinces. It may be noted too th proclamation of Greek independence, it was not only the Ottoman France as well that obtained compensation. What was France being for? As the terms of the London Protocol of 1830 put it:
. . . depuis plusieurs siecles, la France est en possession d'exercer, en faveur d soumis au Sultan, un patronage special que S. M. T.-C. [Sa Majeste tres chret French king] croit devoir deposer aujourd'hui entre les mains du futur Souve Grece, quant a ce qui concerne les provinces qui doivent composer le nouvel se desaisissant de cette prerogative, S. M. T.-C. se doit a elle meme et elle doi population qui a vecu si longtemps sous la protection de ses ancetres, de dem catholiques de la terre ferme, et des iles trouvent, dans l'organisation qui va e la Grece, des garanties capables de suppleer a Faction que la France a exercee jour en leur faveur (ibid.).
The plenipotentiaries of Russia and Great Britain accepted 'la jus demande' (ibid.) implying that the cession not only of territory but o privileges justified the attribution of minority obligations to the beneficia terms of the London Protocol were explicitly reiterated in the cession of Islands to Greece in 1863 both with respect to equality in the secular special mention of Catholics.54 In this case, Great Britain was the transfe as it had exercised a protectorate over the Ionian Islands since 1815 recognised that Britain had been only a tutelary agent and that the loss o over the Ionians accrued to the Ottoman Empire. Similarly, when Th from Ottoman to Greek rule in 1881, a matter which one might have tho a bilateral concern between Constantinople and Athens, the treaty n signed by the Great Power ensured that Ottoman losses would be com minority guarantees in the transferred region.
The lives, property, honour, religion and customs of those of the inhabitants o localities ceded to Greece who shall remain under the Hellenic administration will be scrupulously respected. They will enjoy exactly the same civil and political rights as subjects of Hellenic origin (Article III).
In a telling confusion of ethnic and religious categories, the treaty juxtaposes subjects of 'Hellenic origin' with 'Mussulmans'. The persistence of the principle of compensation comes through in novel fashion in the Treaty of Paris (1856), the peace agreement following the Crimean War. As a member of the victorious coalition, the Ottoman Empire was, for once, victor rather than vanquished whereas Russia now found itself the defeated party. To compensate Russia for losing its longstanding claims to protection of the Christian or Christian
Orthodox population of the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan was made to issue a decree whose terms were incorporated into the Treaty of Paris:
His Imperial Majesty the Sultan having, in his constant solicitude for the welfare of his subjects issued a Firman, which, while ameliorating their condition without distinction of Religion or of Race, records his generous intentions towards the Christian population of his Empire, and wishing to give a further proof of his sentiments in that respect has resolved to communicate to the Contracting Parties the said Firman, emanating spontaneously from his Sovereign will (Article IX).56
In its other clauses, the Crimean settlement again confirmed the traditional pattern where minority rights compensated for territorial concessions. Although the Ottoman Empire had been on the 'right' side in the recent war, it was nevertheless obliged to concede extensive autonomy -indeed, quasi independence -to the two principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. The Muslim Sultan was thus compensated for the reduction of his auth Christian Principalities by the promise that the rights of his Christian su (and, by possible future enactment, his Jewish subjects) would be respecte this was not as incongruous as it might appear if one recalls the 'constant for the welfare of his subjects' expressed in the Imperial Firman invoked of Paris. Presumably, the solicitude of the Sultan applied to all his s whatever faith. In the final analysis, however, it was not the protec erstwhile subjects that was at issue here but the symbolic compensation of loss.
The Treaty of Berlin (1878) completed the process of separatin Montenegro and Romania from the Ottoman Empire. It created principality with substantial autonomy but withheld the province of Easte granting it only special status within Ottoman jurisdiction. As we might e what we have already seen, the full independence of the new states and th of Bulgaria were granted upon the condition that:
The difference of religious creeds and confessions shall not be alleged against a ground for exclusion or incapacity in matters relating to the enjoyment of ci political rights, admission to public employments, functions, and honours, or th the various professions and industries in any locality whatsoever.
The freedom and outward exercise of all forms of worship are assured to all belonging to (Bulgaria, Montenegro, Servia, Roumania) as well as to foreigne hindrance shall be offered either to the hierarchical organisation of the differen communions or to their relations with their spiritual chiefs (Articles V, XXV XLIV).59
This identical clause was inserted for all three new states and for the new Inasmuch as the Sublime Porte had long ceased to exert any effective auth three states, this clause represented a symbolic bow towards Constant Sultan was ceding territory that he had already lost but the Great Powers Berlin were expressing their sensitivity to his susceptibilities and to the r by past cession of territory. In deference to the disappointment Christians and others who were expecting the complete disintegration of t an analogous clause, formulated as a spontaneous declaration of the S introduced to cover the Empire as a whole (Article LXII).
From the point of view of the subjects of the treaty, however, su constituted humiliating restrictions on their recently acquired and sovereignty. The newly independent states had already undertaken commi 1856 with regard to the rights of religious minorities. In 1878, they saw n express these commitments again or to compensate the Sultan further had incurred in the past. The new states resented the minority guaran they realised that the Great Powers were, in fact, compensating themselv pretext of compensating the Sultan. As had happened in 1815 in Vie Britain and France introduced a Polish nationality rights clause as comp being excluded from the spoils of Poland, in Berlin in 1878 the Great Pow minority guarantees as a tax, if not a price, for not being themselve beneficiaries of Ottoman reversals. We may find confirmation of the explanation we are proposing with regard to the logic of minority guarantees by looking at the reverse side of the Treaty of Berlin, namely, the stipulations concerning the Ottoman province of Eastern Rumelia. This region had been incorporated into the independent Bulgarian state proclaimed a few months earlier in the Treaty of San Stefano but it had been restored to Ottoman rule through the terms of the Treaty of Berlin. This restoration was, rightly, seen as a reversal for Christian and Slavic aspirations. Not surprisingly, therefore, the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin concerning Eastern Rumelia were careful to enumerate the various guarantees offered to the defeated Christian party. The treaty statesmen finally addressed this question in the course of clearing up they were utterly unprepared for the complexity of the issue. Wilson w of self-determination had not foreseen the problem of minorities and t had not devised new ways of dealing with it. The decision-makers in P fell back on the established patterns that had developed in the course two and a half centuries and in particular those applied with respec Question. They included in the peace settlements a set of identical 'Min that defined an extensive minority rights regime in each of the count Wilsonians considered these 'Minority Treaties' a corrective c admittedly partial and necessarily messy application of the prin determination. Realists saw them as acknowledgement by the ne states of the debt they owed to the Great Powers. In fact, the sta simply acted as their predecessors had done.
Ironically, it was the lot of the newly recreated Poland to be the fir upon to respect minority rights. Clemenceau went to some pains to 1. ... point out that this Treaty does not constitute any fresh departure. It been the established procedure of the public law of Europe that when a st even when large accessions of territory are made to an established state, the formal recognition of the Great Powers should be accompanied by the requi such state should, in the form of a binding international convention, under with certain principles of government.
Clemenceau invoked the precedents we have seen in the course of t Netherlands in 1815, Greece in 1830, the Balkan states at the Congr added, lest there be any mistake about the nature of the transactio 2. ... I must also recall to your consideration the fact that it is to the end sacrifice of the Powers in whose name I am addressing you that the Polish recovery of its independence.64
The Great Powers were offering compensation to the defeated stat imposing constraints upon their minor allies. As we know, neithe pleased with this solution. Germany and Hungary and, to a lesser e made revision of the Peace Treaties the leitmotiv of their foreign poli no more pleased as a protector of minorities than it had been as a prot these formulae balance the victory of one party with concessions to the defeated party and these concessions are expressed in terms of minority rights. The most recent example of this formula is the solution recently proposed to put an end to the Kosovo crisis. The Ahtisaari Plan promised independence to Kosovo and minority protection to the Serbs of the nascent state. Not surprisingly, the formula was resented by some Kosovars who saw it as an intolerable infringement of the sovereignty they expected, an unjustified concession to a culpable minority, and an arrogant great-power dictate.66 The Serbs, in turn, considered it derisory compensation for the loss of their own sovereignty over the province and an inadequate guarantee of the welfare of the remaining Kosovo Serbs.
The great powers, now known as the 'international community', brandish protection of minority rights, today, in the same way they did in this region in the nineteenth century. Minority rights are the price of statehood and of the satisfaction of national claims, on the one hand, and the indemnification offered for the loss of sovereignty over part of one's state, on the other hand. The price paid to those ceding land and people, in this case, the Serbs, is to be offset by the price paid by those who gain territory and status, the Kosovars. Whatever the accommodations of the past, today neither party is interested in this bargain. Both have learned to deal in the currencies that carry weight in the international system. They both speak in the name of national rights and they both affirm unconditional commitment to human rights. Minority rights, alas, find no buyers on either side.
